Krishnamoorthi Demands Answers from Hegseth After China Reportedly Obtains F-35 Parts

WASHINGTON — On Monday, Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) demanded answers from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth after F-35 parts being shipped from Australia to the United States were diverted to Hong Kong and reportedly taken into the possession of the Chinese government. Krishnamoorthi, a senior member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, called for an immediate review of the incident and a briefing to Congress on what the Pentagon is doing to prevent sensitive U.S. military technology from falling into the hands of foreign adversaries. The shipment reportedly included a weapons-bay door and a jet canopy and stopped in South Korea before being diverted to Hong Kong.

In the letter, Krishnamoorthi writes:

“According to Bloomberg, the Chinese government took possession of the parts and has not returned them. Possession of F-35 parts could allow the CCP to reverse engineer U.S. stealth technology, threatening our service members and national security. Incidents like this simply should not happen, and they raise serious questions over Department of Defense (DOD) and commercial shipping companies’ policies for tracking sensitive U.S. military hardware.”

On broader failures in the F-35 supply chain, Krishnamoorthi writes:

“The F-35 Program supply chain clearly needs more oversight. According to a 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, more than a million F-35 spare parts that were collectively worth $85 million went missing over a five-year period. DOD only investigated 2% of those lost parts.”

Krishnamoorthi requested that Hegseth respond by October 12, 2026 to the following questions:

1. Please provide a detailed account of the shipment’s chain of custody from the time it left Australia until its reported diversion to Hong Kong.
2. Why did the shipment stop in South Korea, who authorized the stop, and how did the shipment ultimately arrive in Hong Kong?
3. What entity was responsible for maintaining the parts’ chain of custody throughout the shipment?
4. Does the Department assess that the diversion resulted from an intentional act, negligence, inadequate safeguards, or subversion? Please describe the basis for this assessment and whether DOD has identified any individuals or entities responsible for the diversion.
5. What actions, if any, has DOD taken to recover the F-35 parts?
6. Why were these F-35 components transported through a commercial shipping network rather than by military transportation? What criteria does DOD use to determine when sensitive F-35 components may be transported commercially, and will those criteria be reassessed following this incident?
7. What is DOD’s assessment of the national security implications of the reported Chinese possession of these F-35 components? To what extent could examination or reverse engineering of the components provide the CCP with information about F-35 capabilities, materials, or other sensitive technologies?
8. Has DOD identified any other instances in which F-35 parts or other sensitive military components have been lost, diverted, or routed through China, Hong Kong, or other territories controlled by U.S. adversaries?
9. What additional steps has DOD taken, or does DOD plan to take, to prevent U.S. military technology from being routed through China, Hong Kong, or other territories controlled by U.S. adversaries?
10. Why has DOD not yet fully implemented the four GAO recommendations made in 2023 regarding accountability for the F-35 global spare parts pool? What is DOD’s timeline for fully implementing each recommendation?

The full text of the letter is available here.