

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

August 27, 2026

The Honorable Todd Blanche
Attorney General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Attorney General Blanche:

I write to follow up on my August 19, 2026, letter regarding the Department of Justice's plan to deploy as many as 1,000 election monitors during the 2026 midterm elections. In that letter, I asked the Department to establish basic safeguards against voter intimidation and to explain how these personnel would be selected, trained, and supervised. Recent reporting has made those questions even more urgent. The Department should answer them without further delay.

Reports indicate that David Michael Levin—a Florida attorney who pleaded guilty in 2016 to unauthorized computer intrusions involving two election websites—appears to have joined the Department's Civil Rights Division and participated in the Department's monitoring of Minnesota's August primary.¹ Photographs and video reviewed by reporters reportedly show Mr. Levin standing alongside a Civil Rights Division attorney at a Minneapolis polling location, where a local election judge intervened after the two men positioned themselves too close to the polling place.²

Mr. Levin's record warrants serious scrutiny. According to Florida investigators, he used SQL injection techniques to obtain the login credentials of the Lee County Supervisor of Elections and used those credentials to access the office's website as an administrator. He also targeted the Florida Division of Elections website.³ He was originally charged with three felonies, ultimately pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors, and served 20 days in jail.⁴

The Department has not publicly explained whether it employs Mr. Levin, in what capacity he may have served, or how he came to participate in a federal election-monitoring operation. Those are not minor administrative questions. They go directly to whether the Department has established a credible process for determining who is entrusted with authority to enter polling locations and interact with voters and local election officials.

Nor does Mr. Levin's reported involvement appear to be an isolated concern. Previous reporting has identified other individuals brought into the Civil Rights Division who have publicly questioned the legitimacy of past elections, including the Division's acting chief of the Voting Section.⁵ These reports raise an fundamental question: What standards is the Department applying when selecting the personnel who will be responsible for protecting Americans' voting rights?

¹ <https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/trump-doj-appears-to-have-hired-lawyer-convicted-of-hacking-election-sites/>

² *Id*

³ <https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/294984-hacker-of-election-supervisor-website-gets-20-days/>

⁴ *Id*

⁵ <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2025/12/eric-neff-new-justice-department-voting-rights-chief-had-prior-job-suspension-for-ties-to-election-deniers/>

That question is particularly important given the Department's broader conduct heading into the 2026 midterms. The Department has launched an aggressive campaign seeking unredacted voter-roll information from approximately 30 states, relying in part on claims of widespread noncitizen voting and election fraud that have repeatedly failed to withstand judicial scrutiny.⁶ At the same time, the Department is dramatically expanding its presence at polling locations, with a planned deployment nearly twice the size of its 2024 effort.⁷

Taken together, these actions have created legitimate concerns about whether the Department's election-monitoring program is designed to protect voters or whether it risks becoming a mechanism for intimidating voters and pressuring local election officials.

That is precisely the concern I raised in my August 19 letter. Election monitors have an important role when properly deployed and appropriately supervised. But that role depends upon public confidence that the individuals entering polling places are properly vetted, trained, impartial, and committed to protecting every eligible voter's right to cast a ballot free from intimidation.

If the reports concerning Mr. Levin are accurate, his presence at a polling location would call that confidence into question. An individual with a documented history of unauthorized access to election systems should not be placed in a position of authority or proximity to voters and election officials without a clear explanation from the Department of the vetting, supervision, and legal authority governing that assignment.

Accordingly, I request that the Department provide answers to the following questions no later than September 3rd, 2026:

1. Is David Michael Levin currently, or has he previously been, an employee, contractor, detailee, or volunteer of the Civil Rights Division? If so, please identify his position, responsibilities, and dates of service.
2. What vetting process does the Department require before assigning an individual to election-monitoring duties, including criminal background checks and reviews of an individual's prior involvement with election systems or election-related activities? Was that process followed in Mr. Levin's case?
3. Were Department officials aware of Mr. Levin's 2016 conviction for unauthorized access to election systems before he participated in the Minneapolis monitoring operation? If so, who approved his participation?
4. Under what legal authority was Mr. Levin present at the Powderhorn Park polling location? Was he a duly appointed federal election observer, a Civil Rights Division employee, or acting in another capacity?
5. What training and written guidance are provided to election monitors regarding permissible conduct inside or near polling places, including restrictions designed to prevent voter intimidation and interference with election officials?
6. What screening criteria will the Department apply to the approximately 1,000 personnel it plans to deploy in November? Will those criteria include an individual's criminal history, prior conduct involving election systems, and public efforts to undermine confidence in lawful elections?
7. Will the Department provide Congress with a written description of the vetting, training, supervision, and disciplinary procedures governing its 2026 election-monitoring program before those personnel are deployed?


⁶ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-lawsuits-state-voter-rolls-justice-department/>

⁷ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-election-monitors-midterms/>

The Department is preparing to place an unprecedented number of federal personnel in and around polling places during a national election. That authority carries an equally unprecedented responsibility to ensure that those personnel are properly vetted and that their presence does not intimidate voters or interfere with local election administration.

The Department should not ask voters and election officials to simply trust that this process is being handled appropriately. It should demonstrate that it is. I therefore request a complete response to the questions above by September 3rd, 2026. Given the proximity of the midterm elections and the scale of the Department's planned deployment, further delay is unacceptable.

Sincerely,



Raja Krishnamoorthi
Member of Congress